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I. DEFENDANT'S REYES CLAIM RISES TO 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holyate. 2000 UT 74, fl 1,10 P.3d 346. "The preservation rule applies to 
every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that 
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' has occurred." Id. 
Exceptional circumstances are esqplained as "those which would e3q)lain and excuse 
a party's failure to raise a claimed ertor in the trial court." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65 (Utah 
App.1990). "Exceptional circumstances sufficient to justify a failure to raise an issue on 
direct appeal are those unusual events or intervening changes in the law which prev«ited the 
movant from being aware of and raising all of his alleged trial errors in his first 
postconviction proceeding.'' Brooksv. State.. 966 P.2d 686,25 Kan. App.2d 466,467 (1998); 
Gibson v. State, 105 P.3d 279 (Table) Kan.App.,2005. "The exceptional circumstances 
concept serves as a 'safety device,' to assure that manifest injustice does not result from the 
failure to consider an issue on appeal." State v. Archambeau 820 P.2d 920,923 (Utah App. 
1991). "Unlike 'plain error,' 'exceptional circumstances' is not so much a precise doctrine, 
which may be analyzed in terms of fixed elements, as it is a descriptive term used to 
memorialize an appellate court's judgment that even though an issue was not raised below 
and even though the plain error doctrine does not apply, unique procedural circumstances 
nonetheless permit consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal." State v. Irwin. 924 
P.2d5 (Utah App. 1996). 
The Connecticut courts give insight into the "exceptional circumstances" preservation 
issues by setting forth two situations which may constitute "exceptional circumstances." State 
V. Evans. 165 Conn. 61,70,327 A.2d 576 (1973). The two situations occur where ".. .a new 
constitutional right not readily foreseeable has arisen between the time of trial and appeal," 
or ".. .the record adequately supports a claim that a litigant has clearly been deprived of a 
fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial." State v. Bowman^ 3 Conn.App. 148, 485 
A.2d 1343, Conn.App.,1985. 
The Utah Supreme Court has similarly indicated that they ".. .are obliged to consider 
[an] argument [not presented in the proceedings below when] it is based on a constitutional 
question and defendant's liberty is at stake." Statev.Jamesoa 800 P.2d 798,802-803 (Utah 
1990). In State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App.1992), this Court employed the 
"exceptional circumstances" rubric where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law 
colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial. 
In the Brief of Appellee, the State argues that Halls' claim under Reyes pertaining to 
his reasonable doubt jury instruction was unpreserved at trial and that no exceptional 
circumstances exist to preserve the issue on appeal. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 6-8. As 
argued in the Brief of Appellant, neither Halls' trial attomey nor any other attomey could 
have raised the issue of the reasonable doubt jury instruction at trial since review had been 
granted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Reves. 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 841, which 
had upheld Robertson. It was unforeseeable by any in the legal profession, save possibly 
those involved in Reyes, that the Utah Supreme Court would expressly abandon and overtum 
an eight-year precedence respecting reasonable doubt jury instructions^ 
The court found that the element of the Robertson test instructing the jury that the 
State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" carried with it a substantial risk that a juror may 
find the defendant guilty based on a standard that was lower than reasonable doubt. Reyes. 
^ It is important to note that two other cases, State v. Cruz. 2005 UT 45, and State v. 
Weaver. 2005 UT 49, were argued the same day as Reves before the Utah Supreme Court. Both 
Cruz and Weaver were arguing in favor of upholding Robertson, stating that they had been 
deprived of their rights by not having the word "obviate" used in their respective reasonable 
doubt jury instructions. Even those parties involved in Reves may not have contemplated what 
the outcome would be given that the sister cases argued at the same time were taking opposing 
positions to Reyes. The Utah Supreme Court upheld Reves in Cruz and Weaver's cases and 
determined that Cruz and Weaver's instructions had adequately conveyed the proper standard to 
the jury without the now abandoned phrase at issue herein. 
2005 UT 33,130,116 P.3d 305. Because the jury in this matter was instructed to "eliminate 
all reasonable doubt" and eliminate and obviate are synonyms, there is similarly a substantial 
risk that one of Halls' jurors found him guilty based on a lower standard than reasonable 
doubt, thus violating Halls' due process rights. 
The fact that Reyes had been granted review by the Utah Supreme Court, but the issue 
had not yet been decided at the time Halls appeared for trial, colored the failure of Halls' trial 
counsel to have raised the issue at trial. See^ Lopez. The court's decision in Reyes is a 
constitutional change in the law that was not forseeable at the time of trial, which allows this 
matter to fall under the "exceptional circumstances" similarly relied upon in State v. Lopez. 
831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992). Altematively, since Halls' liberty is at stake here and this 
issue is constitutional this Court should be ".. .obliged to consider it even though it was not 
raised in the trial court." State v. Jamesoa 800 P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990). 
IL REYES DID NOT REQUIRE THE STATE TO 
ARGUE THAT IT NEED ONLY OBVL\TE DOUBTS 
SUFFICIENTLY DEFINED BY THE JURY 
In State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33, the Utah Supreme Court undertook an extensive 
analysis of their determination to abandon the Robertson test requiring the State to "obviate 
all reasonable doubt," as more particularly set forth in the Brief of Appellant. See, Brief of 
Appellant at pp. 11-13. During this analysis, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also 
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof 
necessary to convict. . .[t]he "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step 
undertaking: the identification of the doubt and a testmg of the validity of the 
doubt against the evidence.. .[t]he beyond a reasonable doubt standard does 
not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability 
either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated 
conviction that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as a 
legitimate basis to acquit. 
Reyes at %ll. This analysis indicates that a juror is legitimate in acquitting when they have 
a doubt based on the belief that the totality of the evidence is insufficient, but cannot 
specifically articulate what that doubt may be. Reyes at ^28, citing Steve Sheppard, The 
Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden ofProofHave Weakened 
the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1165 (2003). 
The phrase that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" improperly permits the 
State to argue that "it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined," thereby 
diminishing the State's burden. Reyes at ^12. The State mistakenly argues in its brief that 
the prosecutor must specifically convey this improperly permitted argument to the jury in 
order for the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" to dhninish the State's burden. Appellee's 
BriefBt pp. 8-10. It is farreaching to believe that, in the process of trying to prove their case, 
a prosecutor would orally articulate to a jury that, if the juror feels doubt but cannot articulate 
or define it, then the State maintains no burden to overcome it. It is clear from the Utah 
Supreme Court's overall analysis of this issue that it did not intend for prosecutors to have 
to take this step in order for defendants to be protected fi-om the substantial risk inherent in 
the phrase at issue herein. Reyes at ^25-30. To require such would be to negate the Utah 
Supreme Court's position on the matter. 
III. CRUZ UPHELD REYES 
The Utah Supreme Court heard arguments on the case of State v. Cruz. 2005 UT 45, 
on the same date as they heard State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33. Although Reyes was determined 
nearly two months prior to Cruz. Cruz reiterates and upholds what the Utah Supreme Court 
held in Reyes. Under Victor v. Nebraska., the model relied upon in the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Reyes and Cruz, the United States Supreme Court held that reasonable 
doubt jury instructions are unconstitutional if they allow " 'a reasonable juror ... [to] 
interpret[ ] the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based upon a degree of proof below that 
required by the Due Process Clause. Victor.511 U.S. 1,6,114 S.Ct. 1239,127 L.Ed.2d 583 
(1994)(citations omitted). This holding in Victor was reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Cruz, as follows: 
Reasonable doubt instructions are imconstitutional if they allow a reasonable 
juror to interpret the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree 
of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause; conversely, so long 
as the reasonable doubt instructions, taken as a whole, correctly convey the 
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury, they pass constitutional muster. 
Cruz at ^21. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Reyes, the ". . .'obviate all reasonable 
doubt' element of the Robertson test carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to 
find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt..." Reyes at f 30. 
In the Brief of Appellee^ the State mistakenly takes the language of Cruz out of context 
by focusing only on a small part of the Cruz decision in an attempt to set the constitutional 
standard as whether the reasonable doubt jury instructions as a whole correctly conveys the 
concept of reasonable iupellee at pp. 10-11. However, 
according to the holdings in Reyes and Cruz, the reasonable doubt jury instruction cannot be 
correctly conveyed to the jury when there is a substantial risk that a juror couiu 
defendant guilty on a degree (tl I'I'IIMI'I l""!.iri' ' - '"'"''" *'"'" """ .11'easonable doubt." The Utah 
Siipririiit! t 'uiirt, was clear that the p,hrasereqinr-' ^ «. lo "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
carries that substantial risk with it. 
The State additionally attempts. ^ ^ -tiUKjiprem€ Court did not uphold 
Reyes viliiii it decided Cruz by stating that the reasonable doubt jury instruction in Cruz 
contained substantively the same language as the phrase "obviai aa ji avai d 
was upheld by the Utah Supreme . i^ ^ - /i;/./^ / I/Y* /-- 1. The State, however, 
misreads Cruz to tlieir own advantage. The State argues that since Cruz's reasonable doubt 
jury instruction indicated that the evidence must "dispel all reasonable doubt;" Cruz at % 3, 
that this is substantively the same. -^^ sonable doubt" phrase analyzed in 
Reyes. However, in Cruz, the instruction required the evidence to dispel all reasonable 
doubt, while the Reyes instruction requires the State to obviate all reasonauic 
rise to the substantial risk articulaii :"ti in ilic lleycs analysis"' 
In addition to the aforementioned differences, the State also fails to mention that Cruz 
only challenged his instruction based on the star led in Robertsoi-, 
expressly abandoned by the UtaliSupi'i i I "n il 1 lleves and could thus not be upheld for 
See, Argument "11" supra. 
Cruz. Without a challenge to the phrase "dispel all reasonable doubt/' the Utah Supreme 
Court was without authority to determine whether this phrase would additionally carry the 
same substantial risk as the phrase in Reyes. The State attempts to argue that Cruz somehow 
overtumed the holding in Reyesrespecting the "obviate all reasonable doubf' phrase, but it 
is clear from its intentions that the Utah Supreme Court upheld Reyes through its 
determination in Cruz. 
IV. HALLS' SENTENCE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
A« No Finality of Judgment Existed* 
The court in Com v. McDermott. 224 Pa 363, 73 A 427, 24 LRA NS 431 (1909), 
observed that the word "conviction" has a popular and a legal meaning, stating as follows: 
In common parlance a verdict of guilty is said to be a conviction ...and this 
popular meaning has been given to it when rights other than those of the one 
who has been found guilty have been before the courts...But a very different 
situation is presented when one is confronted with an indictment charging him 
with a prior conviction of a similar offense, and the statute makes his alleged 
repetition of it a distinct crime, for which, upon conviction of it, severer 
penalties are to be imposed. In such a case the word 'conviction' must be given 
its strict legal meaning of judgment on a plea or verdict of guilty. The severer 
penalty is imposed by the Legislature because that imposed for the first offense 
was ineffectual. The second offense, carrying with it severer penalties, is 
therefore not conmiitted in law imtil there has been judgment for the first. 
In Com, ex rel. Trotter v. HendricL 197 Pa.Super. 230,177 A.2d 162, Pa.Super 1962, 
the court states that Commonwealth v. McDermott. 224 Pa. 363,73 A. 427,24 L.R.A.,N.S., 
431 and Commonwealth ex rel. McClenachan v. Reading, 336 Pa. 165,6 A.2d 776 have the 
purpose *to assure an accused a imai v^ icrinuii ii -.i i i' liiM puilt before he is thereafter 
subjt or enhanced penalties therefor." 
The Utah Supreme Court has similarly held as follows in Emmertson \ State "Tax 
Commission: 
^1^^ pgj.gQi^  J^ ^g|- ^ IgQ ijgyg ^ ggj^  sentenced under the former verdict to make 
it a former conviction, because the more severe penalty is provided upon the 
theory that the first penalty was insufficient to cure or check the tendency to 
do the imlawful, and only because the penalty on first conviction is not severe 
enough to checkmate the criminal tendency is a second offense made a more 
serious crime. The distinctions so indicated clearly appear in the cases. 
72 P.2d 467 ( Utah 1937) citing Commonwealth v. McDermott 224 Pa. 3 6 J . i . 4z /: ^late 
V. Brown. 115 Mo. 409, 22 S.W. 367: Yo- \, x^amausen. Wilmoth v. 
Hsisel, 151Pa.200,. i » K. Smith v. Commonwealth. 14 Serg. & R. 
11' I 169: Muckenfuss v. State. 55 Tex.Cr.R, 216,117 S.W. 853; 3 Cokeys Institutes ( rhomas) 
559; Wharton, Law Lexicon. 
.isriefofAppeUtt,, iU Sijilr Jirgues that Halls invited the alleged error pertaining 
to the lack of finality of judgment in a prior conviction which was used to enliance I la I is' 
current sentence. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. :.. -criies that.,, based upon 
Halls' stipuiatiuii • he trial court did not commit an error by sentencing 
him before the prior judgment was amended. I / 
In this matter, Halls' trial counsel stipulal- i i i. behalf to the fact that he had 
previously been convicteii i issessioii RMi ;it pp. 50-51, 183. Trial counsel had 
researc^ ^^ ^^  the prior charge and found that the judgment incorrectly stated that i laiis nau u^-^.x ^  
convicted of possession with intent to distribute. Id. at p. 48. The court allowed the 
stipulation to stand as proof of the prior conviction for purposes of enhancement. Id. at pp. 
187-188. None of the parties, nor the trial court made a motion to amend the prior judgment 
at that time. The only determination that was made was that the prior judgment was incorrect 
and needed amending. 
Halls' sentence could not have been enhanced based upon the prior offense since there 
was no judgment on the former charge. As a sentence cannot be entered without the finality 
of judgment, then an enhanced sentence canriot be imposed upon an individual without a 
finaljudgment from the first conviction. Emmertson. Because no finaljudgment had been 
entered on the prior possession charge. Halls sentence should not of been enhanced based on 
the stipulation of the parties. 
B. Alternatively, Halls' Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim," 'a defendant must show (1) 
that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.' " Wickham v. Galetka. 
2002 UT 72,119,61 P.3d 978 (gt/o/mg State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236,243 (Utah 1995)); see 
also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984). In making this evaluation, the court must "indulge in the strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is 
10 
the defendant must overcome the presun *^ e circumstances, the challenged 
action migi nsidered sound trial strategy. Mvers v. State. 2004 UT 3 1 , ^20, 94 
2 1 1 , c/Ymg State v .Templ in , 805 P.2d 182 ,186 (Utah 1990) (quoting StricKmiiu. 
at 6 8 9 , 1 0 4 S.Ct. 2052) (intemal quotations and citatii >. 
In U.S . V. Kissick. IJ i i'^ '* Circuit Court of Appeals held that Kiss ick ' s counsel ' s 
"failure to challenge the Florida conviction a t Mr. Kiss ick ' s sentencing cc»iisiI i l 
constitutionally deficient representation. 99 1996). Further, when 
this deficient repiv.-.. nnnled with the prejudice resulting from the enhanced 
sentence, the 10* Circuit held that Mr. Kissick met the Strickland v, yyqsningtom *. 
668 (1984) standard for establishing ineffeclivc assistam •. ii -i oiinsel." Hal l s ' trial counsel 
£^ll^^ ^^ j^^ l^l^ j^ j^ g ,^. ^ 1 viVtion based on its inaccuracies rather than counseling Halls 
to stipulate to it, when the prior judgment had not'been made final and there was i iojudgment 
on which to base the current enhancement. 
I 11 ' i II ii s, I III II, 11 I i n 11 s • counsel mistakenly counseled Halls to stipulate to the 
prior conviction when the prior judgment was flawi iJ I 'ly doing this, Halls'" coi insel fell 
below the objective standard of reasonableness i' i I'iilipp, ti) protect Halls' best interests. 
Had he instead diallenged the prior conviction based on its inaccuracies, the State would 
have not had the prior conviction upon which to base the request ^eot and, 
similar to Kissick, Halls would not have suritt\ -^ ^^ lire occurring therejfrom. Should 
this Court deternii of judgment was imnecessary based upon Halls' 
11 
stipulation, it should find that Halls' trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 
to adequately advise Halls of his options pertaining to the stipulation. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing. Appellant respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's Judgment. 
DATED this 24* day of October, 2005. 
Andrew Fitzgerald 
Attomey for Franklin Eric Halls 
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